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This article describes the current state of economic theory intended to explain the
unequal distribution of wealth among U.S. households. The models reviewed are
heterogeneous agent versions of standard neoclassical growth models with
uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. The models endogenously generate
differences in asset holdings as a result of the household's desire to smooth
consumption while earnings ﬂuctuate. Both of the dominant types of
models—dynastic and life cycle models—reproduce the U.S. wealth distribution
poorly. The article describes several features recently proposed as additions to the
theory based on changes in earnings, including business ownership, higher rates
of return on high asset levels, random capital gains, government programs to
guarantee a minimum level of consumption, and changes in health and marital
status. None of these features has been fully analyzed yet, but they all seem to
have potential to move the models in the right direction.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.When U.S. households are ranked according to how much
wealth they hold, they form a lopsided picture:
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• The bottom 40 percent of all households have only
about 1 percent of all the wealth in the nation.
• The top 1 percent of all households have nearly 30
percent of all the wealth; the top 5 percent, 55 percent
of the wealth; and the top 20 percent, 80 percent of
the wealth.
• Partly as a result of those two extremes, the standard
measure of the dispersion of wealth, the Gini index, is
large: 0.78.
ChangingthesefactsabouttheU.S.wealthdistributionhas
for years been a recurrent theme of political discussions.
But before workable policies to change the facts can be
formulated, thefacts themselves must be understood. Why
is the wealth distribution so lopsided? What characteristics
in the economy were essential to produce this form of dis-
tribution? Providing such an understanding of data is the
job of economists, and unfortunately, with regard to the
wealth distribution, that job has just begun.
In general, to try to understand facts reﬂected in data,
economists create theories, expressed through mathemati-
cal models, that are meant to capture the features that best
account for those facts. Then they test the theories by hav-
ing the models generate data and comparing the models’
data with the facts. In the last few years, economists have
begun to try to develop a theory capable of quantitatively
accounting for the U.S. wealth data.
Thistheoryhasfocusedonchangesinearnings,thefea-
tureeconomiststraditionallyhaveseenasdirectlyaffecting
different levels of savings and wealth. Households have
been thought of as facing temporary shocks to their earn-
ings which they cannot insure against in any way other
thanpersonalsaving.Thus,accordingtothistheory,house-
holds must self-insure against random ﬂuctuations in their
earnings; households save in good times so that they can
dissave in bad times. The wealthy households are those
who have experienced streaks of good times in the recent
past.
Models incorporating this abstraction have been able to
generate a distribution of wealth which replicates some of
thepropertiesoftheU.S.distribution.However,theresem-
blance between the models’ and the data’s distributions is
not satisfactory. This suggests that models with only dif-
ferent realizations of a common earnings process are miss-
ing some features essential to account for the wealth dis-
tribution. Other features must be added to the theory of the
wealth distribution in order to account for the facts.
Here, we review the progress made so far toward the
development of a theory of the wealth distribution. The
modelsthathavebeenusedtostudythewealthdistribution
are heterogeneous agent versions of standard neoclassical
growth models with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to
earnings. The equilibria of these models can be found by
numerical methods, and theproperties of the equilibria can
be compared with the properties of the data. These models
endogenously generate differences in asset holdings as the
result of households’ desire to smooth consumption in the
presence of time-varying labor earnings. The key feature
of these models is, then, that the distribution of earnings is
exogenous, while the distribution of wealth isendogenous.
The two dominant types of models used generally in
macroeconomics have been used to study the distribution
of wealth. The dynastic model includes the inﬁnitely lived
agent abstraction and assumes that people care for their
descendants as if they were themselves, and the life cycle
model includes overlapping generations of ﬁnitely lived
agents who do not care about their descendants. Thus, the
main motive for saving—aside from insuring against
shocks to earnings—differs in these two types of models:
in dynastic models, people save to improve their descen-
dants’ consumption, while in life cycle models, people
save to improve their own consumption during retirement.
Technically, these models are also different in terms of the
tools that are used to characterize their equilibrium allo-
cations. Moreover, before we can compare the models
with the data, the dynastic model requires that we adjust
the wealth distribution to eliminate the role of age, while
the life cycle model does not. Therefore, the success or
failure of one of these types of models is not necessarily
related to the success or failure of the other. For all these
reasons, these two structures require separate analyses. We
demonstrate here that both types of models reproduce the
wealth distribution data poorly.
We then review some other features that have been re-
cently proposed as worthy complements to the theory of
thewealthdistributionbasedonchangesinearnings.Some
of these extra features are better suited to be embedded in
a dynastic model, while others belong in a life cycle mod-
el. None of the features has been fully analyzed yet, but
along with the earnings process, they all seem to have the
potential to dramatically affect the decisions of households
to save.
These extra features tend to apply to people in speciﬁc
circumstances—primarily, either the rich or the poor, that
is, those with either the most or the least wealth. Richer
people, for example, are more likely to be entrepreneurs,
who have limited ability to borrow in order to ﬁnance their
production projects. Richer people are also more likely to
be concerned with the higher rates of return that high lev-




Studies of all these proposed model features represent
movements in the right direction. The preliminaryﬁndings
indicate that including them in models with temporary
shocks to earnings will move us closer to being able to un-
derstand the U.S. distribution of wealth.
The Dynastic Model
Again, most of the efforts to understand the wealth dis-
tribution have been focused on changes in earnings, and
two types of models have been used. Let’s look ﬁrst at the
dynastic model. The key property of this type of model is
that in it people live forever. The dynastic model thus
implicitly assumes a strong linkage of individuals and
their progeny. We analyze ﬁrst the version of this model
in which agents’ earnings are deterministic. In that ver-
sion, the distribution of wealth is indeterminate, which
demonstrates the need for a mechanism to generate deter-
minate wealth distributions. We analyze then a version of
the dynastic model in which agents face idiosyncratic
earnings shocks that are not insurable. We call this the
stochastic version of the dynastic model even though ithas no aggregate uncertainty and it generates determinate
wealth distributions. Unfortunately, even though this ver-




In a dynastic model, households’ preferences are generally
given by the expected value of a discounted sum of per pe-
riod utilities. The model has a production sector that trans-
forms capital K and labor N services into output, through
an aggregate production function, ƒ(K,N), which in turn
can be used either for investment (to increase capital or to
make up for the fraction d that depreciates) or for con-
sumptionpurposes.Inthistypeofmodel,householdsdiffer
in their asset holdings,
2 which are denoted by a.T od e -
scribe the economy at a point in time, we need a descrip-
tionoftheamountofassetsthateachagenthas.Mathemat-
ically the best way to describe the asset amount is through
a probability measure over wealth levels, which we denote
by x. This measure lets us not keep track of the names of
the agents. In this model, all assets are real
3 and aggregate
capital, the sum of wealth held by all households, is given
by the ﬁrst moment of the measure; that is, K = ò a dx. The
measure x is a sufficient description of the state of the
economy.
The deterministic version of a dynastic model has no
shocks that affect households and, hence, no precautionary
savings. The market structure assumed is that of a se-
quence of markets for capital, labor, and the consumption
good. This market structure implements the Pareto optima
that are also achieved with an Arrow-Debreu complete
market structure. Chatterjee (1994) shows that in this sort
of model, the main properties of the distribution of wealth
are self-perpetuating and people do not move from one
economic level to another. That is, if all households hold
the same wealth today, they will all hold the same wealth




al productivity of aggregate capital is equal to the rate
of time preference.
• With homothetic preferences, if xt(A) is the measure
of agents over the subset of asset holdings A at time
t, then xt+1(atA)=x t ( A ), where at is a positive real
number; that is, all agents change their wealth in the
same proportion.
Chatterjee (1994) also shows that with more general (but
identical across agents) preferences, some of the key fea-
tures of the shape of the initial wealth distribution x0 are
maintained over time. The deterministic version of the dy-
nastic model is, therefore, silent with regard to the wealth
distribution because the initial conditions determine cur-
rent and future conditions.
The Stochastic Version
A version of the dynastic model that has stochastic fea-
tures at the individual, but not the aggregate, level can be
readily constructed in which households are subject to un-
insurable idiosyncratic shocks.
Shocks are typically posed as stochastic disturbances
on the labor earnings of the households (Aiyagari 1994).
One way to put shocks into the model, for example, is to
let the efficiency units of each agent, denoted by s Î S º
{s1,...,sn}, follow a Markov chain with transition matrix
G[s¢ s]. The process for the shocks can accommodate
both transitory and permanent components.
To see this, imagine that the economy has I types of
agents, types which differ in their long-run average earn-
ings. Each type i Î {1,...,I} can have J possible individual
states, some better than others. This framework can be
embedded in the general structure by letting G be a block-
diagonal matrix, with I blocks denoted by Gi of dimension
J × J. In such a model, the probability measure describing
the economy x accounts not for the distribution of wealth,
but for the joint distribution of shocks and asset holdings.
Again, the aggregate capital of the economy is the sum of
the assets of all households, K = ò a dx, and aggregate em-
ployment is the sum of the efficiency units of labor that
each household has and that we normalize to 1; that is,
N = ò sd x=1 .
In this world, agents save for precautionary reasons to
smooth consumption, and the economy can be character-
ized as a permanent income world. In good times, agents
save a higher proportion of their income than in bad times,
and agents with high wealth are those who have had a
recent history of good times. The agents’ positions in the
wealth distribution change over time between a lower
bound a _ (imposed either by the existence of credit con-
straints or by the value such that in an agent’s worst pos-
sible state, the interest payments are not higher than the
agent’s labor income) and an upper bound a ¯,such that an
agent who has assets above this level always (for all s)
chooses to have a smaller next-period wealth, since more
consumption-smoothing brings no further gains. The exis-
tence of this upper bound requires the interest rate to be
lower than the rate of time preference; otherwise, agents
would not have an upper bound on savings (Huggett 1993,
Lemma 1).
A steady state can be deﬁned as a stationary measure
x*, a pair of prices for labor and for rental services of cap-
ital w and r, a value function for the agents v(s,a), and an
associated decision rule a¢ = g(s,a) such that
• The decision rule g solves the problem of the agent:
(1) v(s,a) = maxc³0,a¢Î[a _,a ¯] u(c)+b
s ¢G [ s ¢s ] v ( s ¢ ,a¢)
subject to
(2) c + a¢ = a(1+r)+ws.
Equation (1) gives the value to the household that has cur-
rent shock s and wealth a; this value is equal to the maxi-
mum of the utility u( ) that can be obtained from con-
sumption c in this period plus the discounted (by b) ex-
pected value of having asset holdings a¢ in the next peri-
od. Equation (2) is the budget constraint: the sum of cur-
rent consumption plus next period’s wealth must equal the
sum of capital and labor income plus the wealth that was
brought into the period. Together, the two equations con-
stitute the recursive form of the standard utility maximiza-
tion problem subject to a budget constraint.
• Theaggregatecapitalgeneratedbythestationarymea-
sure x* induces factor prices r and w deﬁned as(3) r =ƒ K( ad x *,1) − d õ
ó
S,A
(4) w =ƒ N( ad x *,1). õ
ó
S,A
These are the conditions that factor prices equal marginal
productivities.
• The decision rule g(s,a) and the process for the shock
Ggeneratethenext-perioddistributionofagentsx*ac-
cording to this mapping:
(5) x (S0,A0)=õ
ó
S 0,A 0 õ
ó
S,A
ca¢ g(s, a)G[ s¢ s] dx ds¢da¢
for all appropriate sets {S0,A0} over which the mea-
sure is deﬁned and where c{a¢=g(s,a)} is an indicator
function that takes the value of one if the statement
is true and zero otherwise.
This is the steady-state condition: if today’s distribution of
wealth is x*, tomorrow’s should also be x*. Note that
x*(S0,A0) is obtained by counting over all the households
(given by the inner integral) that choose to have assets in
A0 and have shocks in S0. (The indicator function tells us
which households to count, and the transition matrix G
tells us how many to count given the previous shock.)
Steady states with a lower interest rate than the rate of
time preference have been shown to exist (Laitner 1979
and 1992, Bewley 1984,Clarida 1990, and Aiyagari1994)
and also to be the only type of steady state that can exist
(Huggett 1995), although more than one of this type may
exist. To achieve this lower interest rate, aggregate capital
in the stochastic version of the dynastic model must be
higher than aggregate capital in a deterministic version.
The difference between these two amounts of capital are
referred to as precautionary savings. Steady states can be
readily found by iterative procedures. (For a description of
the methods involved, see, for example, Aiyagari 1994 or
Ríos-Rull 1995.)
Note that a key feature of models of this type is that the
distribution of earnings isexogenous,
4while the modelen-
dogenously generates a distribution of income and wealth.
Since the interest rate is lower than the rate of time prefer-
ence in these models, households save for consumption-
smoothing purposes. Hence, the key determinant of sav-
ings is not the permanent component of the process for the
shock, but rather its transitory component. So the key
property of the distribution of earnings in endogenously
generating the distribution of wealth is the volatility of in-
dividual earnings, not permanent differences in earnings
across households (Constantinides and Duffie 1996). In
terms of the transition matrices G, what matters is the mo-
bility induced by each Gi, not the differences across earn-
ings types.
Empirical Properties
In dynastic models with earnings uncertainty, differences
in wealth are a function partly of age and partly of the
strings of good or bad times in people’s lives. People of
the same age can, and, in general, will differ in the amount
of wealth they hold. Now we can look at what dynastic
models imply quantitatively about the wealth distribution,
and we can compare these empirical properties with the
data.
Examples of dynastic models with precautionary sav-
ings to smooth consumption in the presence of uninsur-
able earnings uncertainty include those of Aiyagari (1994)
andCastañeda,Díaz-Giménez,andRíos-Rull(1997).These
models differ in the process chosen for earnings.
In the baseline parameterization of Aiyagari (1994),
agents face an uninsurable random stream of yearly labor
earnings that follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process
in logs with an autocorrelation of 0.6 and a standard de-
viation of the innovations of 0.2, which yields an uncondi-
tional coefficient of variation of 0.312. These ﬁgures are
based on estimates from Abowd and Card (1989), who
use several panel data. These ﬁgures are also consistent
with the ﬁndings of Heaton and Lucas (1996), who use
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Aiyagari
(1994) also considers a process with twice the standard
deviation of the innovation for earnings, which results in
an unconditional coefficient of variation of 0.625; this is
a much higher variability than the estimates in the litera-
ture of variations in individual earnings.
Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (1997) ex-
plore the role that spells of unemployment play in shaping
the distribution of income and its cyclical properties. For
theseresearchers,allﬂuctuationsinearningsareassociated
with changes in employment.
5 Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez,
and Ríos-Rull study two environments, one in which all
agents are ex ante identical and one in which there are ﬁve
types of ex ante identical agents. Across types, agents dif-
fer on their skill level (average wages) and on the process
for the spells of unemployment. The process for the spells
can be calibrated to observed features of unemployment in
the data, such as the level and the duration of unemploy-




the speciﬁc calibration,see Ríos-Rull 1993 and Castañeda,
Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull 1997.)
Table 1 reports some distributional statistics for U.S.
earnings of people 35–50 years old and for the earnings
of agents in the four models just discussed. Since these
models abstract from life cycle considerations, we try to
correct the U.S. data by looking at a subset of ages that
excludes both early starters and retirees. The speciﬁc age
group that we choose does not matter much, as can be
seen in the work of Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini, and Ríos-
Rull (elsewhere in this issue of the Quarterly Review).
Perhaps the most noticeable feature of Table 1 is that
all four models have a lot less earnings inequality than the
data do. This is by design. The ﬁrst three models abstract
from any considerations regarding permanent differences
in earnings across agents: all differences in the ﬁrst three
models are temporary and are the differences responsible
forgeneratingdifferencesinwealthholdings.Thelastmod-
el has differences in average earnings across individuals,
but these differences are from average labor earnings for
only ﬁve groups. This reduces the importance of the tails
of the distribution and so underestimates the variability of
earnings. As we will see, in this type of model, what mat-
ters in generating wealth dispersion is not permanent dif-
ferences in earnings but temporary differences, since the
main motive for accumulating wealth is to create a buffer
against earnings ﬂuctuations.Table 1 also reports the same statistics for the distribu-
tion of wealth that are reported for earnings. All the model
economies generate some wealth concentration, with the
ﬁrst three models generating more wealth concentration
than the original earnings concentration, but still a lot less
than the wealth concentration found in the U.S. data:
• Regardingthebottomofthedistribution,allfourmod-
els generate a bottom 40 percent of agents who hold
considerably more wealth than their counterparts in
the data.
• The top groups hold considerably less wealth in the
model economies than in the U.S. data, with the same
relativeperformanceofthedifferentmodels.Themod-
el that performs best on this measure (Aiyagari’s high
variabilitymodel)accountsfor58percentoftheshare
of wealth held by the top quintile and 14 percent of
the share held by the top 1 percent of the population).
• The Gini indexes are lower in the model economies
than in the data.
Overall, we see that Aiyagari’s high variability model
is the one that performs best, followed by Aiyagari’s base-
line model and then the unemployment model with iden-
tical-skill agents. The unemployment model with differ-
ent-skill agents generates the least wealth inequality even
though that model has a considerable amount of earnings
inequality. This is due to the fact that Aiyagari’s two mod-
els have more earnings variability at the individual level
thantheothermodelsdo. (TheAiyagarimodelsincludeall
possible sources of individual earnings variability, while
the other models include only unemployment ﬂuctuations
as sources of earnings variability.) However, even Aiya-
gari’s high variability model, the economy that severely
overrates the individual variability of earnings, can only
account for part of the wealth concentration. Nevertheless,
again, the ﬁrst three model economies generate a higher
concentration for wealth than they did for earnings.
To see that what matters for wealth concentration is not
permanent, but temporary differences in earnings, look at
the data generated by the two unemployment models in
Table 1. Both of these model economies have the same
source of variability: ﬂuctuations in employment. In the
model with identical skill levels, all agents are ex ante
equal, while in the model with different skill levels, agents
differ ex ante both in their permanent labor earnings and
in their individual process for employment, with lower
earnings agents having higher employment variability.
Consequently, the economy with all agents ex ante equal
has a lower Gini index of earnings (0.06) than the econo-
my with different types of agents (0.30). But the economy
with all agents ex ante equal is the one with the higher
Gini index for wealth (0.14). Moreover, in the multiple
earnings type of economy, income has a lower Gini index
(0.28)thandoesearnings(0.30),whichsuggestsanegative
correlation between earnings and wealth due to the fact
that the lower earnings households are the wealthier ones.
Agents with low average earnings have higher earnings
variability than agents with high average earnings (Clark
and Summers 1981, Kydland 1984, Ríos-Rull 1993).
Although the quantitative properties of the models vary
with the parameterization, those variations are very small.
Most of the parameters of these models are well tied
down by equilibrium properties of the models, except for
the coefficient of risk aversion s. The results reported in
Table 1 are for a value of s = 1.5. For larger and general-
ly unused values, such as s = 5, for example, Aiyagari
(1994) obtains a Gini index for wealth of 0.32 with the
earnings parameterization of his baseline economy.
To summarize, dynastic models with uninsurable idio-
syncratic risks can generate differences in asset holdings
across individuals and more wealth concentration than that
of earnings, although the wealth concentration is smaller
than that in the data. We conclude that the way the dynas-
tic model builds in the precautionary motive against un-
insurable ﬂuctuations in earnings is not adequate to ac-
count for U.S. households’ wealth accumulation patterns.
The Life Cycle Model
So now let’s examine the other primary way that changes
in earnings have been modeled in an attempt to account
for the U.S. wealth distribution. In the life cycle model,
recall, people do not live forever as they do in the dynas-
tic model. The central feature of the life cycle model is
that people are born, work for a number of periods, retire,
and die. (During their working years, people save for
retirement.) This type of model has a long tradition, start-
ing from the work of Samuelson (1958) and Ando and
Modigliani (1963), but not until the work of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) was it used for quantitative purposes.
This type of model generates a well-deﬁned income and
wealth distribution given a path for earnings of people at
various ages (an age-earnings proﬁle).
We start by reviewing the life cycle model in its basic
form, with a deterministic life cycle path for earnings, and
we move then to the stochastic version in which agents
face idiosyncratic shocks to their earnings. We ﬁnd that
with regard to reproducing the main features of the U.S.
wealth distribution data, a life cycle model is also inade-
quate for the job: it can generate a Gini index for wealth
similar to that in the data, but it does so by exacerbating
the indebtedness of the young, and it underpredicts the
share of wealth of the very rich.
The Deterministic Version
In the life cycle model, a constant number of households
(normalized to 1) are born each period, and they live I pe-
riods. Preferences are represented by the discounted sum






where ci denotes consumption at age i and b is the age-
independent discount rate. Note that we have not labeled
variables by the period that they refer to; we are going to
look at only steady states of these economies. Agents have
one unit of time per period that they use to work. One
unit of time of an age i agent transforms into ei units of
the labor input, making eº{ e 1,...,eI} the endowment vec-
tor of efficiency units of labor of the households. The
model also has a government that taxes labor earnings at
an age-speciﬁc rate ti to pay for a fully funded Social Se-
curity system that gives beneﬁts bi to age i households.
In deterministic life cycle models, households face the
following list of budget constraints:
(7) a1 =0
(8) ai(1+r)+e iw (1−ti)+b i=a i +1 + ci(9) ai+1 ³ 0
for i = 1, ..., I. Here, again, w is the price of one effi-
ciency unit of labor and r is the rate of return of assets in
the economy. Equation (7) states that households are born
with zero wealth. Equation (8) is the standard budget con-
straint that links sources and uses of funds. Equation (9)
is the condition that prevents households from borrowing.
Note also that in this world everyone in the same genera-
tion has the same wealth a.
A useful way of writing the problem of the agent is
recursively:
(10) vi(a) = maxc,a¢³0u(c)+b v i +1(a¢)
subject to
(11) a(1+r)+w e i(1−ti)+b i=c+a ¢
(12) a¢³0
with the end conditions
(13) vI+1 =0
(14) a1 =0 .
A steady-state equilibrium with a balanced budget is a
sequence {ai} that solves (10)–(14); its associated aggre-
gate capital, K = åiai, and aggregate labor, N = åiei, such
that the marginal productivities they generate are the fac-
tor prices r and w; and a government that satisﬁes its bud-
get constraint, åitieiw = åibi. The ﬁrst two of these con-
ditions are standard; the third requires that Social Security
outlays, åibi, equal government revenue, åitieiw.
Empirical Properties
In deterministic life cycle models, all differences in wealth
are a function of age, so this type of model cannot ac-
count for any of the intracohort wealth differences that are
as big as those for the economy as a whole. Still, we can
see how the wealth differences across groups compare to
those in the data.
Huggett (1996, p. 482) reports some statistics from a
model economy of this type in which agents are prevented
from borrowing. (See Table 2.) This economy has been
calibrated to match the age-earnings proﬁle of U.S. males,
and the economywide capital-to-output ratio is 2.9. In a
version without early death, people live 98 years. Huggett
ﬁnds that this economy generates a wealth Gini index of
0.47, the wealthiest 1 percent own 2.4 percent of total
wealth, the top 1–5 percent own 9.2 percent of total
wealth, and the top quintile own 42.8 percent. Again, the
concentration of wealth in this model is much lower than
that found in the data, despite the fact that the share of
people with zero wealth in the economy is 14 percent,
twice the share in the data (7 percent).
Allowing for some borrowing by agents does change
matters somewhat. [This implies weakening the require-
ment a¢³0 in equation (12) to aI+1 = 0.] In particular,
with a borrowing limit equal to one year’s worth of av-
erage earnings, the Gini index for wealth rises to 0.54; the
share of the top 1 percent rises to 2.7 percent, the next 4
percent’s share rises to 12.7 percent, and the top quintile’s
to 46.6 percent. But this is achieved by placing a quarter
of the population in a zero or negative wealth position, a
much larger share than the 7 percent found in the data.
Moreover, in these two versions of Huggett’s model, only
the youngest groups are in a zero or negative wealth posi-
tion, while in the data zero or negative wealth is more
evenly dispersed across age groups.
A life cycle model like this generates a sizable amount
of wealth inequality, although not nearly as much as can
be found in the U.S. data. In particular, this type of model
cannot generate enough wealth concentration in the top 5
percent of the population, and it cannot generate within-
cohort wealth differences.
With Permanent Earnings Differences...
Within-cohort differences can be generated by including
permanent earnings differences across households. Incor-
porating this feature in the life cycle model is straightfor-
ward. We need only label the vector of age-speciﬁc earn-
ings in equation (8) not only by age, but also by type, eji.
Of course, now the value functions generated in problem
(10)–(14) will be indexed by j as well.
However,the scopeofwealth differencesacross groups
that can be generated with this device is limited. If the dif-
ferent types of agents have earnings that are proportional
toeachother,theirwealthdifferenceswillinheritthisprop-
erty, and as we have seen, wealth is more concentrated
than earnings. Some wealth differences can also be gener-
ated by having groups of households with different shapes
of the age-earnings proﬁle, but adding this feature pro-
duces only small wealth differences.
For example, Fullerton and Rogers (1993) study how
different social groups fare in terms of paying taxes. They
pose a model in which agents differ in lifetime earnings
ability within each cohort. With this device, the spread of
the U.S. earnings distribution can be replicated, but the as-
sociated distribution of wealth does not generate a thick
enough upper tail. To generate a wealth distribution con-
sistent with the data,7 Fullerton and Rogers (1993) impose
bequestsasaconstraintontheproblemoftheagents.More
precisely, in their model, agents receive a certain size of
bequest, indexed by type j, and have to leave the same size
of bequest to their descendants (appropriately adjusted for
population and productivity growth). The size of the be-
quest used is obtained from Menchik and David (1982).
The degree of concentration generated by this procedure is
not endogenous, but is imposed in the calibration stage.
Therefore, this approach does not help us understand what
the factors are that underlie the wealth concentration.
. . . And Precautionary Savings
We turn now to life cycle models which include a precau-
tionary motive for saving (in a very similar fashion to that
posed in the dynastic model). In these stochastic models,
uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks are self-insured by accu-
mulating more wealth than that held for pure life cycle
reasons.
Adding uninsurable risk to the life cycle model is quite
simple. Earnings are affected by a shock s that changes
the per period endowment of efficiency units of labor.
This shock follows a Markov process with transition prob-
ability matrix G[s¢ s].
8 The problem of the agent is now
(15) vi(s,a) = maxc,a¢ U(c)+b E { v i +1(s¢,a¢) s}
subject to(16) a(1+r)+swei(1−ti)+b i=c+a ¢
with vI+1 =0 ,a 1=0 ,a n da I +1 ³ 0. The solution to this
problem is a¢ = g¢ i(s,a). The existence of uninsurable risk
implies that agents of the same age will have different
wealth if they have had different earnings histories. The
different properties of the agents can again be summarized
with the aid of a measure x that describes the size of
groups of people in each age-wealth-earnings group. Now
aggregate capital in the economy is given by K=òI,S,A a dx.
Here, as in the dynastic model, a steady state requires
that the agents solve their maximization problem, that fac-









and that the economy not change over time;
9 that is, given








c a¢ gi−1(s,a) G[s¢ s] dx di¢ ds¢ da¢.
The ﬁrst two of those conditions are standard. The third
requires that total Social Security payments, given by the
left side of (17), equal the taxes levied by the government,
the right side of (17). Finally, the fourth condition, that the
economy not change over time, is a steady-state condition
identical, except for the role played by age, to that in (5).
Empirical Properties With Earnings Uncertainty
In life cycle models with earnings uncertainty, differences
in wealth are a function partly of age and partly of the
strings of good or bad times in people’s lives. People of
the same age can and, in general, will differ in the amount
of wealth they hold. Now we can take a look at what life
cyclemodelswithidiosyncraticearningsuncertaintyimply
with respect to the distribution of wealth and how that
compares with the data.
Huggett (1996) studies the properties of the distribution
of wealth using an explicit general equilibrium version of
a life cycle model with earnings uncertainty. The process
for earnings is characterized by the sum of a deterministic
life cycle component that changes with age and a stochas-
tic component. The stochastic component has a standard
deviation of 21 percent and an autocorrelation parameter
of 0.96. Table 3 shows the Gini indexes and shares of
total earnings and wealth in the United States and in this
version of Huggett’s model. We can see that despite the
lower earnings concentration in Huggett’s model, the Gini
index for wealth is very close to that for wealth in the
data. Unfortunately, the reason for such a high Gini is not
that the richest people are as rich as in the data, but that
the model has many more people with zero or negative
wealth than in the data (24 percent versus 7 percent), and
again, these people are basically young. Huggett (1996)
also considers economies in which people face the pos-
sibility of early death and economies in which people’s
preferences have higher risk aversion, and the same basic
characteristics, perhaps exacerbated, hold.
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To summarize, we see that life cycle models with earn-
ings uncertainty, although capable of generating a large
Gini index for wealth, do not replicate the large amount
of wealth at the top of the distribution, and they imply
that most poor people, especially those with negative or
zero wealth (of which there are many more than in the
data), are young, whereas in the United States their ages
are more spread.
Beyond Earnings
As we have seen, in both the dynastic and the life cycle
models, precautionary motives for saving based on unin-
surable idiosyncratic shocks to earnings can generate siz-
able differences in cross-sectional wealth holdings. How-
ever, in both types of models, these differences are smaller
than the differences found in the data. This discrepancy
implies that features other than uninsurable differences in
earnings must be considered in order for the models to be
able to account for the distribution of wealth. Because the
models so far have had difficulty with the two ends of the
distribution, any features added to the models should be
able to signiﬁcantly affect the savings decisions of house-
holds at one end of the distribution or the other.
Anothercrucialpropertythefeaturesneedistobebased
on observables. This means that any additional feature that
affects the savings decisions of the different households
must be related to some characteristic of the households
that is directly measurable.
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Here we brieﬂy describe four of the features that re-
searchers have proposed as good candidates for additions
to the models. All of these features seem likely to work in
the right direction of spreading out the wealth distribution.
We don’t know yet, however, what the quantitative impor-
tance of any of them is or whether all of them are required
to account for the facts of the U.S. wealth distribution.
The Rich
We start by looking at features that primarily affect the
savings decisions of households that are quite wealthy.
Business Ownership
One of these is business ownership. Díaz-Giménez, Qua-
drini, and Ríos-Rull (in this issue, Table 9) report earnings,
income, and wealth for both the self-employed and work-
ers in the data. An important feature of these data is that
entrepreneurs’ wealth is almost ﬁve times that of workers
(which puts the average entrepreneur in the top 10 percent
of the wealth distribution) while the earnings of entrepre-
neurs are less than double those of workers. This observa-
tion suggests that entrepreneurs have different motivations
for saving than workers do.
To properly model entrepreneurship, some departures
from the standard model with uninsurable earnings risk
must be made. The key role is played by imperfections in
capital markets. Speciﬁcally, the following features are,
we think, required:
• The rates of return of borrowing and lending are dif-
ferent due to costly intermediation. This provides en-
trepreneurs with a savings motive which other house-
holds do not have: entrepreneurs face a higher rate of
return.
• Agencyproblemsrequireentrepreneurstohaveacon-
siderable amount of equity in their businesses. This
issue,togetherwithminimumsizerequirementsintheoperation of businesses, requires entrepreneurs to be
relatively wealthy even before they open shop. Thus,
it gives a further motive to save for those whose asset
holdings are not far from the threshold required to be-
come an entrepreneur.
• Entrepreneurs are not ex ante different from other
types of agents. Entrepreneurs simply choose to en-
gagein different activitiesthan otheragents dueto the
circumstances in which they get involved. In other
words, every agent is a potential entrepreneur.
Quadrini (1997) follows these insights by constructing
a general equilibrium model in which agents decide in
each period whether or not to run a business. In Qua-
drini’s model, running a business requires a certain mini-
mum stock of capital, but imperfections in the ﬁnancial
markets prevent the entrepreneur from borrowing all the
needed funds. Furthermore, the income generated by the
project is quite variable.
Three features are particularly important in character-
izing the equilibrium of this model economy: the presence
of borrowing constraints, which has the effect of selecting
entrepreneurs among richer families; the existence of a
higher cost of external ﬁnance, which induces people who
are entrepreneurs to accumulate more wealth in order to
save on this cost; and the risk associated with business ac-
tivities (higher than that associated with labor earnings),
which provides entrepreneurs with an additional motive to
increase their precautionary savings. Hence, Quadrini’s
model generates more inequality than does a similar mod-
el without entrepreneurs. In a calibrated version of the dy-
nastic model with earnings uncertainty (which we saw is
notgoodatgeneratinghighwealthconcentration),theGini
index for wealth rises from 0.55 to 0.73 while the wealth
ofthetop1percentofagentsrisesfrom4percentto24per-
cent.Thisisaccomplishedwithoutgeneratinganexcessive
number of agents with negative wealth: the high interest
rate paid for loans prevents agents from borrowing too
much.
Modeling entrepreneurs explicitly is a promising line
of research to understand the behavior of households in
the right tail of the distribution, and it emphasizes the fact
that earnings opportunities may be related to wealth hold-
ings. Compared with people in other employment groups,
entrepreneurs face a higher effective rate of return and the
shocks to their earnings (given by matrix G) have a higher
variance. These two effects tend to induce higher savings
for agents with higher levels of assets, which is what we
need models to do more of.
Increasing Asset Returns and Capital Gains
The portfolio of wealthy households typically includes
assets that yield higher returns than the assets of poorer
households. The higher the rate of return, the more attrac-
tive is delaying consumption, which gives the wealthy a
motive for saving that poorer households do not have.
Higher rates of return on assets for high asset levels
can be modeled by posing two savings technologies: one
with low returns and no ﬁxed costs (say, a savings ac-
count) and another with high returns but certain ﬁxed
costs (in terms of resources, knowledge, or time). Includ-
ing this feature in a model induces poor households to
hold the low-return asset and rich households to hold the
high-return asset.
Unfortunately, the existence of returns that increase
with the level of assets implies certain technical difficul-
ties in terms of solving the maximization problem of the
household. The budget set is nonconvex, which implies
that the ﬁrst-order conditions are not sufficient. To avoid
this technical problem, some preliminary work has been
done by Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (1996).
They study the distributional effects of tax changes using
a stochastic process for the idiosyncratic shock that affects
not only the process for earnings, but also that for the rate
of return. Stochastic returns are posed in the form of oc-
casionalcapitalgainsandlosses.Castañeda,Díaz-Giménez,
and Ríos-Rull have found that stochastic capital gains are
necessary to generate high levels of wealth concentration.
The Poor
We now turn to features that primarily affect the savings
decisions of those households that are poor, or have low
levels of wealth. We start with a brief description of what
these features are and how they affect households, and
then we describe two studies that have considered them.
The Features
Guaranteed Minimum Consumption. The key rationale for
savings that we have reviewed states that households save
to prevent future drops in earnings from dramatically re-
ducing their consumption. If the government has a policy
that guarantees a certain minimum level of consumption,
then those households that foresee that their consumption
is likely to remain below the government set minimum
have no incentive to accumulate assets. If these people do
accumulateassets,andtheirearningsdodrop,theywillnot
receive what the government would otherwise have given
them. In other words, this policy implies that for poor peo-
ple, the effective tax rate on savings can be above 100 per-
cent. Consequently, once a household achieves a very low
asset level, and if its earnings are not expected to grow
much, the optimal strategy for that household may be to
not accumulate assets and, rather, to remain poor forever.
Health and Marital Risk. As we have seen, the central
sourceofriskinmodelsofthewealthdistributionischang-
es in earnings. To specify an earnings process, researchers
have calibrated a common process for individual earnings.
But that type of process is not the only one that can be
used to describe earnings. Events such as long-term health
deterioration (including that of family members) can have
a dramatic effect on the well-being of the people involved
without necessarily leading to large changes in measured
earnings.Thistypeofwhatiseffectivelyalargeriskwhich
is only partially insurable might send many people into
poverty (and at the same time increase the precautionary
motive for saving of people who are not subject to these
extreme circumstances).
The data also suggest another feature that can be ex-
plicitly modeled and that is intimately related to earnings
and wealth: people’s marital status. As we can see in the
work of Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (in this
issue, Table 9), households of different marital status have
dramatically different proﬁles for earnings, income, and
wealth. For example, married couples have a wealth-to-
income ratio of about 4, while singles with dependents
have a ratio of only about 2.5. Also, note that singles with
dependents fare much worse than married couples or even
thansingleswithoutdependents.BaneandEllwood(1986)ﬁnd that 11 percent of all poverty spells are triggered by
transition into female-headed families and that 38 percent
of the women who make the transition from being married
to being single parents fall into poverty. In addition, John-
son and Skinner (1986) document that family income, par-
ticularly for women, dramatically drops when people di-
vorce. For obvious moral hazard reasons, changes in mar-
ital status are uninsurable, and they constitute a particular
form of risk that does not appear directly in individual
earnings data. The explicit consideration of uninsurable
changes in marital status should be important to character-
ize households at the bottom of the wealth distribution, es-
pecially among the middle-aged and young.
The Studies
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) consider a life cycle
model similar to the one with precautionary savings de-
scribed earlier, but they add consumption support policies
and health risks.
In their formulation, the consumption support policy is
modeled as a minimum level of consumption guaranteed
by the government. Therefore, in addition to Social Secu-
ritytransfersbi,thebudgetconstraintoftheagentsincludes
transfers T necessary to guarantee the minimum consump-
tion level ¯ c. Health risks in this model take the form of a
shock that requires expenditures of resources without pro-
viding utility. In order to distinguish the earnings shock
from the health shock, denote the former by s
1 and the lat-
terbys
2.ThetwoshocksareassumedtobejointlyMarkov
with transition matrix G.




(20) T = max{0,¯ c + s
2 − a(1+r) − (1−t)s
1wei − bi}.
Thisbudgetconstraintprovidesverylowincentivestosave
at low levels of wealth, since it means that for low realiza-
tions of s
1 (recurrent unemployment) and for large realiza-
tions of s
2 (expensive illnesses), the government will ef-
fectively conﬁscate all of the household’s savings.
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) point out that if
the population is sorted into three education classes (no
high school degree, a high school degree but no college
degree, and at least a college degree), the implied age pro-
ﬁles of wealth and earnings do not seem to be generated
by the same type of maximization problem with linear
budget constraints, since the no–high school group holds
very low assets, particularly in the years before retirement,
when assets held should be highest. Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes argue that this observation is due to the existence of
means-tested government programs that provide a safety
netfor consumption in aworld with signiﬁcant uncertainty
in earnings and medical expenditures. Hubbard, Skinner,
and Zeldes ﬁx the consumption ﬂoor ¯ c at $7,000 (in 1984
dollars) by assessing the properties of a variety of govern-
ment welfare programs. Their measure of earnings uncer-
tainty (the residual of the log of earnings that cannot be
accounted for by demographic and education variables)
follows a highly autocorrelated process (with an autocor-
relation parameter of about 0.95 for the three education
groups), and the standard deviation of the innovations is
about 18 percent for the no–high school group, 16 percent
for the high school group, and 13 percent for the college
group. The measure of medical expenses uncertainty that
this study uses has an autocorrelation parameter of 0.901
and a standard deviation of 42 percent for the no–high
school group and 39 percent for the high school and col-
lege groups. Given the transfers structure assumed, the
study abstracts from Social Security.
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) are able to repli-
cate some features of the data, such as the fractions within
each education group that receive public assistance, with-
out concentrating poverty in the youngest groups, an out-
come that arises in other life cycle models. Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) do not report measures of con-
centration because they are not interested in the whole
distribution of wealth. But we can easily see how a model
of this type could generate a large number of households
with very little wealth for all age groups, one of the key
properties of the data that we are interested in. Although
this type of model does not have features that could gen-
erate a concentrationof wealth at thetop of thedistribution
that is higher than those generated by other life cycle
models, the model does seem to have promise for the
bottom of the distribution.
Cubeddu and Ríos-Rull (1996) explicitly model chang-
es in marital status as a source of risk. They pose a life
cycle model with agents differing in sex, and they model
marital status as an exogenous idiosyncratic shock that af-
fects earnings and the size of the household. This shock
follows a Markov process that generates a distribution of
people across marital status that resembles the distribution
in the data. In this model, agents and households are not
the same thing. The model has single-agent and multi-
agent households. Differences in marital status histories
determine current differences in wealth. The key items to
use in a model like this are the asset-splitting rules in the
event of divorce, the maximizing problem that the house-
hold solves, and the modeling of how consumption expen-
ditures in multiperson households translate into consump-
tion enjoyed by the different agents.
Cubeddu and Ríos-Rull (1996) use this model to assess
the importance of changes in social habits, such as increas-
es in divorce and illegitimacy rates in shaping aggregate
savings, but this type of model can also be used to try to
assess the role of marital status in shaping the distribution
ofwealth.Intheequilibriumoftheirmodel(asinthedata),
the poorest households are those that consist of an unmar-
ried person with dependents.
The marital status of the household and its associated
savings decisions, perhaps also with government transfers,
seem promising features to build into models in order to
try to understand the low levels of wealth held by large
numbers of households in middle-aged groups.
Conclusion
We have reviewed some of the standard quantitative
models of capital accumulation and heterogeneous agents,
and we have examined their ability to replicate the main
features of the wealth distribution observed in the U.S. da-
ta. Most of these models are based on uninsurable idio-
syncratic risks to households’ earnings that introduce pre-
cautionary savings as the main mechanism that generates
differences in asset holdings. We have shown that these
models can generate substantial differences in asset hold-
ings, but they still fall short of accounting for the high con-
centration of wealth observed in the U.S. data. We havediscussedsome otherresearchthatconsiders otherfeatures
underlyingthe generationofwealthdifferences. Thiswork
points to the key role played by entrepreneurship, increas-
ing returns on assets, government consumption support
policies, and changes in health and marital status. While
the study of these features has just begun, the results so far
suggest that including the features in computable general
equilibrium models will help the models account for the
wealth differences across households observed in the data.
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Giménez, Mark Huggett, and the editors and referees of this journal. Ríos-Rull thanks
the National Science Foundation for ﬁnancial support. This article is dedicated to the
memory of Rao Aiyagari.
1These are 1992 data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. For details on the
data and their sources, see the article by Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull else-
where in this issue of the Quarterly Review.
The lopsided picture holds if the data are broken down by the age of the head of
the household. For households with a head between 35 and 50 years old, the bottom
40 percent of all households have 2.2 percent of total wealth; the top 1 percent, 28 per-
cent of total wealth; the top 5 percent, 51 percent; and the top 20 percent, over 75 per-
cent; and the Gini index for this age group is 0.76.
2People might also differ in the wage that they command, since they can have
different amounts of efficiency units of labor.
3This does not necessarily mean that agents cannot borrow, since x can have mass
on the negative numbers. It just means that ﬁnancial capital and real capital are perfect
substitutes.
4Slightly more sophisticated versions of these models with an explicit leisure
choice would have as exogenous not the distribution of earnings, but the distribution
of wages per unit of working time.
5Actually, Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (1997) study the cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations of the distribution of income, so their economy has aggregate ﬂuctuations.
From the individual point of view, this feature translates into changes in the process for
the employment shock that depends on the aggregate state of the economy. But these
changes are small and do not affect the main properties discussed here.
6Krusell and Smith (1996) report basically the same ﬁndings in a similar envi-
ronment.
7Generating such a distribution is important for Fullerton and Rogers’ (1993) pur-
poseofassessingtheimpactoftaxationacrossdifferentincome,wealth,andagegroups.
8Note that here, just as with the dynastic model, this notation can be used to refer
to permanent differences in households.
9This condition is implicit in the deﬁnition of steady states for deterministic life
cycle economies.
10I ˙mrohoro˘ glu,I ˙mrohoro˘ glu,andJoines(1994and1995)andespeciallyI ˙mrohoro-
˘ glu and I ˙mrohoro˘ glu (1995) also study distributional issues in a model of this type.
These studies distinguish three types of agents based on education levels and pose a
processforearningsuncertaintythatislooselyassociatedwithunemployment.(Relative
earnings between the two individual states match the ratio of earnings while employed
to earnings while unemployed, but the model period is calibrated to a year whereas av-
erage unemployment duration is actually only a few weeks.) Note that the objective of
these studies is to analyze the role of Social Security as a partial earnings insurance,
not to study wealth concentration. Therefore, not surprisingly, these studies ﬁnd that a
model speciﬁed in this way severely underpredicts inequality. Speciﬁcally, the Gini in-
dex for wealth in the model is 0.43. Inequality is also small within age groups; for
example, the Gini index for wealth is 0.20 for the 34–46 age group, while it is 0.13 for
the 47–59 age group.
11Another way to increase the savings motives for the rich and decrease them for
the poor is to assume that households have different preferences. Some researchers
have followed this strategy. Krusell and Smith (1996) and Sarte (1995), for example,
pose models with differences in the rate of time preference. Krusell and Smith (1996)
avoid absolute concentration of wealth among the most patient because their model has
a role for precautionary savings. Sarte (1995) uses a progressive income tax system to
equate after-tax rates of return. Gomme and Greenwood (1995) use recursive prefer-
ences: for them, the most patient are not only richer, but also more risk neutral. How-
ever, justifying differences in preferences to account for the wealth distribution is hard
because preferences are not observable and any wealth distribution can be accounted
for in this way.
Another approach, that follows the work of Duesenberry (1949), is to have models
in which households care about their relative wealth in ways that increase the return of
being rich. In this vein, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) explore a mechanism
that induces households to care in equilibrium about their relative performance in terms
of assets. This mechanism thus provides an accumulation rationale for richer house-
holds, in addition to increasing future consumption. In the work of Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (1992), a market failure in the form of a local externality in consumption
is responsible for creating savings incentives that affect the ordering. Presumably, the
environment can be chosen so that some properties of the wealth distribution of the
model match those of the data. Concerns about relative wealth also have the problem
of being based on unobservables.
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Gini Bottom Top
Variable Source of Distribution Index 40% 20% 10–5% 5–1% 1%
Earnings Actual U.S. Data* .51 10.3 53.6 10.7 13.5 14.1
Model-Generated Data
Aiyagari Models:
Baseline .10 32.5 26.0 6.5 5.8 1.7
High Variability .23 25.6 32.8 8.2 8.1 2.8
Unemployment Models:
Identical Agents .06 37.5 21.7 5.4 4.3 1.1
Different Skill Levels .30 20.6 37.9 10.2 8.1 2.0
Wealth Actual U.S. Data .76 2.2 77.1 12.6 23.1 28.2
Model-Generated Data
Aiyagari Models:
Baseline .38 14.9 41.0 10.5 9.9 3.2
High Variability .41 13.1 44.6 10.9 11.6 4.0
Unemployment Models:
Identical Agents .14 30.6 27.6 6.9 6.2 1.8
Different Skill Levels .13 32.0 27.5 7.2 6.2 1.7
*The U.S. earnings data are for household heads aged 35–50 years.
Sources: 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances; Aiyagari 1994; Castaneda,
Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull 1997
Table 1
Theory Faces Facts: Stochastic Dynastic Models . . .
Actual U.S. Earnings and Wealth Distributions in 1992
and Distributions Generated by Four Stochastic Dynastic Models
~Table 2
. . . Deterministic Life Cycle Models . . .
Actual U.S. Wealth Distribution in 1992
and Distributions Generated by Huggett’s
Two Deterministic Life Cycle Models
Share of Total Sample $
in Each Wealth Group
Gini Bottom Top
Source of Distribution Index 40% 20% 5–1% 1%
Actual U.S. Data .78 1.4 79.5 24.0 29.6
Model-Generated Data
With No Borrowing .47 5.7 42.8 9.2 2.4
With Some Borrowing* .54 .4 46.6 12.7 2.7
*Borrowing is limited to one year’s worth of average earnings.
Sources: 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances; Huggett 1996, p. 482Table 3
. . . And a Stochastic Life Cycle Model
Actual U.S. Earnings and Wealth Distributions in 1992
and Distributions Generated by Huggett’s Stochastic Life Cycle Model
Share of Total Sample $ in Each Earnings or Wealth Group
Gini Bottom Top
Variable Source of Distribution Index 40% 20% 10–5% 5–1% 1%
Earnings Actual U.S. Data* .55 8.1 55.8 11.2 14.7 13.6
Model-Generated Data .42 9.8 54.2 11.4 15.4 7.2
Wealth Actual U.S. Data .78 1.4 79.5 12.6 24.0 29.6
Model-Generated Data .74 .0 72.3 17.1 22.7 11.1
*The U.S. earnings data are for household heads aged 20–65 years.
Sources: 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances; Huggett 1996, p. 482